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Environmental philosophers have had a great deal to say about nature as it has been 
conceived by scientists. They have had much to say about nature as it has been 
conceived by other philosophers. But they have had comparatively little to say about 
nature as we experience it in the living of our lives. In the following, I argue that this 
lack of attention to nature-as-experienced is a cause for regret, and not just for 
rhetorical reasons, not just because it makes the discipline of environmental 
philosophy seem disagreeably abstract and high-flown. I contend that this inattention 
to experience is a bad thing because environmental philosophy that fails to connect 
with our lived experience of nature is, more often than not, bad philosophy. 
 If the first general aim of this book is to challenge a popular, overly abstract 
approach to environmental philosophy, its second is to show, through example, the 
merits of an alternative approach. My second general aim, then, is to do 
environmental philosophy by paying close attention – closer than is usual – to how we 
experience the natural world. Accordingly, I engage not just with the works of 
philosophers, but also with the testimonies of a diverse collection of naturalists, 
scientists, poets and explorers - from the writings of J. A. Baker to the poetry of 
William Wordsworth, and from the passionate prose of Henry David Thoreau to the 
more sober reflections of modern-day scientists. 
Taking such an experience-focused approach, I develop original accounts of 
(1) what the natural world is, and (2) how we ought to act towards it. And along the 
way, I hope to cast new light on some of the key problems in environmental 
philosophy: What is our place in nature? Do any nonhuman animals have minds? 
How are we to conceive our moral relations with the natural world? Does the natural 
world exist independently of our understanding of it? These are all familiar topics, of 
course, but this will be environmental philosophy seen from the ground up, starting 
from our lived experience of nature. 
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Φ 
 
If these are the book’s aims, its subject matter is the natural world as we experience it 
in the living of our lives. So this book is about the many faces of nature-as-
experienced. It is about nature’s familiarity and what Iris Murdoch once called its 
‘sheer alien pointless independent existence’ (2007: 83). It is about those parts of the 
natural world to which we find ourselves drawn, and those from which we feel 
repelled. In the most general terms, it is an attempt to understand what it is like to 
inhabit a world that is in various senses and to varying degrees ‘natural’ rather than 
‘human’ - a world of roots, soil and leaves, and not just of plastic and tarmac.  
Expressed in more technical language, this book is about ‘the phenomenology’ 
of our relations with the natural world. Yet the word ‘phenomenology’ denotes not 
just the object of this study but also its method, for in examining what it is like to 
experience the natural world I will adopt a phenomenological approach. 
 I will have more to say in a moment about what it means to adopt a 
phenomenological approach to our relations with the natural world (and in particular, 
I will clarify what I mean by ‘nature’ and ‘the natural world’). First, however, I ought 
to say a few words about what it means to adopt a phenomenological approach to 
anything. 
In very general terms, to take a phenomenological approach is to do 
philosophy by attending to and reflecting on one’s experience. At first sight, this 
might seem an odd way to go about doing philosophy. After all, it is commonly 
thought that it is not the philosopher’s job to reflect on what it is like to experience 
phenomena. To be sure, some cursory observations about how things present 
themselves to us in experience may provide a fitting hors d’oeuvre, but it is often 
supposed that, once she has made these observations, the philosopher should proceed 
fairly quickly to the main course, a set of reflections on more abstract and general 
topics. So, for example, having briefly registered the fact that she seems to be 
surrounded by various material objects, the philosopher should feel perfectly justified 
in moving on to consider the more interesting question of whether those objects are 
really there. Or having made some quick observations about the apparently conscious 
behaviour of her fellow humans, she should feel free to consider the meatier 
philosophical question of whether those apparently conscious beings really are 
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conscious and not mindless automata or ‘zombies’. This is simply the vaguely 
Platonic way in which philosophical inquiry is thought to proceed: away from the 
confusion and ambiguity of the phenomenal world and, as quickly as possible, 
onwards and upwards towards a clearer, cleaner realm of pure abstraction. 
 The worry, then, is that to the extent that the phenomenologist focuses on 
experience, she won’t be doing anything philosophically interesting, and that to the 
extent that she does anything philosophically interesting she won’t be focusing on 
experience. But this worry is unfounded (as is the general conception of philosophy 
on which it rests). For it is a mistake to suppose that describing what presents itself to 
us in experience is an easy task and one that can (and should) be quickly got out of the 
way before proceeding to the main business of doing philosophy. On the contrary, as 
one phenomenologist points out, it requires ‘much time and effort’ to ‘lay bare’ ‘the 
world which is revealed to us by our senses and in everyday life’ (WP: 39). Time and 
effort is needed because we – philosophers and to some extent non-philosophers too - 
are subject to certain entrenched prejudices which lead us to misconstrue what 
presents itself in experience. This is not to say that we tend to misunderstand why 
things present themselves to us in experience in the way they do (although we are no 
doubt prone to do this). It is to say that we tend to misconstrue what presents itself to 
us in experience. That which seems so clear and obvious, the world revealed to us by 
our senses and in everyday life, is not what we think it is at all. So, for instance, it is 
often supposed that experience presents us with what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls an 
‘objective world’, a realm of determinate objects arrayed in Euclidean space 
according to an absolute and quantifiable measure of time, and related to one another 
by various external relations. But does the world really present itself to us in this way? 
It might seem obvious that it does, but to be certain, one way or the other, one must 
interrogate one’s experience. And to interrogate one’s experience, or at least to do it 
thoroughly, one needs to employ a phenomenological approach. In order to discover 
‘the phenomenology’, one needs to do phenomenology. 
 To do phenomenology is not merely to catalogue the content of experience. 
For one thing, phenomenologists are not primarily concerned with what one 
experiences, but with how one experiences it. Their primary concern is not with the 
object of experience but with one’s experience of it. And here their chief aim is, by 
attending to and reflecting on what presents itself to us in experience, to discover 
general truths about how anything is experienced. This is philosophically significant 
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in two respects. First, phenomenological inquiries can have a deconstructive or 
therapeutic effect. In particular, they can (and have been used to) undercut a variety of 
pernicious sceptical doubts. So, for instance, a phenomenological approach can be 
used to undercut sceptical doubts about the reality of the external world or the 
existence of other minds. Second, and more positively, phenomenological inquiries 
can yield new and interesting philosophical insights. In Being and Time, Martin 
Heidegger uses a phenomenological approach to investigate what it means for 
anything to be (his famous ‘question of the meaning of Being’). Through careful 
reflection on what presents itself to us in experience, Merleau-Ponty develops an 
original conception of what it means to be embodied. Proficiently employed, the tools 
of phenomenology can be used to shed light on the deepest and most important issues 
in philosophy. So if phenomenological inquiries can dispel a variety of philosophical 
confusions, they can also open our eyes to new philosophical truths. Either way, when 
it is done well, phenomenology can transform the conceptual landscape of 
philosophy. 
 
Φ 
 
I have been referring to how we experience the world, but of course all this applies to 
the natural world as well. In fact, interest in environmental phenomenology or ‘eco-
phenomenology’ has been rapidly growing, with the result that it is now a recognised 
genre in the environmental literature. This rise in interest owes in large part to the 
influence of a few treatises. Here several works could be mentioned: Erazim Kohák’s 
The Embers and the Stars, a beautiful paean for our lived experience of natural things, 
inspired chiefly by the works of Edmund Husserl; Lorne Neil Evernden’s The Natural 
Alien, a critique of technocratic, managerial approaches to environmental problems 
and a sustained argument for an approach that takes seriously our pre-reflective 
encounters with nature; David Abram’s The Spell of the Sensuous, a call, inspired by 
the works of Merleau-Ponty, for us to reacquaint ourselves with what it is like to 
inhabit the natural world ‘from within’ (1996: 65). The list could be extended, but 
there is no need: we will engage with many of the seminal treatises in environmental 
phenomenology in the following chapters. For the moment, I would like instead to 
consider what exactly it means to do environmental phenomenology. 
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The first thing to note is that environmental phenomenologists seek to 
elucidate what is often referred to as our lived experience of nature, nature as it 
discloses itself to us in the living of our lives (see Kohák 1984: 22). To do this, they 
seek to bracket or put out of play certain entrenched second-order or theoretical 
conceptions of what nature is, notably the widespread assumption that the world is not 
only an objective world, in Merleau-Ponty’s sense, but also one that is fundamentally 
material in composition. As one environmental phenomenologist explains: 
 
Far more than we ourselves usually realize, when we make seemingly obvious 
assertions about ‘nature’, we are no longer speaking about the natural 
environment of our lived experience… Our statements are far more likely to 
refer to a highly sophisticated construct, say, matter in motion, ordered by 
efficient causality, which is the counterpart of the method and purpose of the 
natural sciences rather than an object of lived experience. (Kohák 1984: 12) 
 
In lived experience, however, a commitment to materialism is difficult to sustain, for 
in the living of our lives we are presented with a world that is deeper, richer and in 
many respects stranger than materialists would have us believe. Pre-reflectively, the 
beechwood does not reveal itself as a collection of determinate material objects 
arrayed in Euclidean space. The place is suffused with meaning and value. In Roger 
Deakin’s nice image (2008: xiii), one looks up at the canopy as if to the shallows from 
a seabed; the darkness in the forest’s depths is not merely an absence of light but a 
haven for hidden creatures; this or that branch discloses itself as one that could be 
grasped or thrown or snapped; that path reveals itself as the one leading to such and 
such a place. Space is not experienced as metres and centimetres, but as ground to be 
covered, as a felt sense of expansive freedom or a stifling sense of its lack. Time here 
is congealed in the trunks of trees, or it is failing sunlight filtered through their 
branches. It is the rise and fall of the sun and the moon, the turning of the seasons. 
 Just as phenomenology can ‘awaken our experience of the world’ (PP: 206), 
so environmental phenomenology can awaken our lived experience of the natural 
world. I shall argue that this is a good thing, ethically, aesthetically and (for want of a 
better word) spiritually. But it is also radical philosophy. First, phenomenological 
inquiries have the potential to undercut certain dogmas of environmental philosophy. 
So, for instance, in Chapter 2 I show that a prevalent form of scepticism regarding 
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animal minds rests on an implausible account of how we relate to nonhuman animals 
in the living of our lives. In Chapter 3 I argue that the perennial debate about the 
metaethical source of natural values presupposes a false ‘subjectivist’ picture of the 
relation between human beings and the world. Furthermore, while these debates and 
problems are undercut, new avenues of philosophical inquiry are opened up. 
Environmental phenomenology is not just a new approach to the old issues. It is a way 
into a host of new issues as well. 
 
Φ 
 
I have been referring to ‘nature’ and what is ‘natural’. But what exactly do I mean by 
these terms? The question must be asked since both terms are used in a variety of 
ways. The natural is sometimes contrasted with the supernatural. And if one has no 
time for talk of gods, angels and demons, nature (the set of natural things) may be 
thought to encompass everything that exists. In other contexts, nature is opposed to 
culture (as in references to ‘nature versus nurture’), yet in others it is taken to refer to 
the essential characteristics of a thing, such that individual things (and kinds of thing) 
are thought to have natures. To complicate matters further, ‘nature’ is often thought to 
have normative connotations – for instance, to say that an act is against nature is 
usually to say that it is morally wrong. 
 The list could doubtless be extended. But there is little point in trying to 
provide a comprehensive account of all the ways the terms ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ have 
been used. And it would certainly be unwise to try to come up with a definitive, one-
size-fits-all definition. Nonetheless, since we need to have some idea of our subject 
matter, let me offer the following, very provisional definition: 
 
 A thing is natural to the extent that its current state is relatively unaffected by 
human agency. 
 
On this definition, Astroturf and human footprints come out as non-natural, since both 
are produced by humans (the fact that the footprints may not be intentionally 
produced is of no account). Birds’ nests and beavers’ dams, by contrast, count as 
natural (they’re not the products of human agency). Hedgerows come out as natural, 
for although human beings originally created them, their current makeup typically 
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owes more to natural forces (the weather, colonisation by wild plants, the local 
wildlife) than to human ones. For similar reasons, the Scottish Highlands may be 
considered natural because, although they were in large part formed through human 
action (clearances and the like), their current state is, by and large, the product of 
nonhuman forces. As Robert Macfarlane suggests, ‘despite the human influences in 
their making’ these places have ‘become wild’ - become natural, one might say (2007: 
80).  
 Three points of clarification. First, I am using ‘thing’ in a very broad sense to 
denote, not just solid material objects but, more broadly, any part of the biosphere that 
can be named – so not just trees and pebbles, but clouds, and not just entities, 
however solid or insubstantial, but also substances (like fresh water) and even places, 
habitats and environments. Second, although I will discuss the various ways that our 
experience of nature is conditioned by social and cultural factors, I am not impressed 
by claims that nature (or the natural world - I will use the terms interchangeably) is 
nothing more than a social construction, or something of that order. (I explain why I 
think this sort of constructivism is false in Chapter 5.) Third, I allow for degrees of 
naturalness. So although I am willing to concede Bill McKibben’s point (1990) that, 
due to the influence of anthropogenic pollutants upon the weather, no part of nature 
remains entirely independent of human influence, I’m also happy to affirm that the 
rainforest on the eastern slopes of the Andes is more natural than London’s Hyde 
Park, not because the rainforest is not managed at all (it might well be), but because it 
is managed less intensively than the park. 
 In relation to the last of these points, it should be noted that allowing for 
degrees of naturalness does not invalidate all talk of what is natural. There are degrees 
of baldness, yet (unfortunately for men like me) it still makes sense to say that one 
man is bald while another is not. The same holds true of naturalness. Perhaps nothing 
on earth is entirely unaffected by the actions of Homo sapiens, yet some things are 
sufficiently uninfluenced to warrant the ascription ‘natural’. There is no good reason 
to suppose that the only nature is pristine nature, untouched by human hand. 
Furthermore, when it comes to classifying something as natural (as being more 
natural than not) I am inclined to be accommodating. So, as I said, I am happy to 
affirm that hedgerows or the Scottish Highlands are natural. And for similar reasons 
I’m willing to call some gardens natural as well – particularly ones of a wilder sort.  
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 It is not my intention, here, to trace out a conception of the natural that is in 
any way unfamiliar or controversial. On the contrary, my aim is to approximate the 
way the term is used in references to natural history. After all, one would not be 
surprised to tune into a TV programme called ‘The Natural History of Britain’ to find 
the presenter discussing badgers or old growth oak woodlands. One would not be 
surprised to find her saying something about hedgerows and gardens. She might even 
have something to say about ecological cycles or cosmic ones, especially their 
influences on life on earth. It is unlikely, however, that the presenter would devote 
much time to urban environments, save for the purpose of examining the nonhuman 
animals that live there or, perhaps, for drawing some analogy between human social 
behaviour and that of some nonhuman species. 
 
Φ 
 
The general aim of this book is to develop a phenomenology of the natural world, an 
environmental phenomenology. On the one hand, I develop a new 
phenomenologically-based account of what the natural world is, one that does justice, 
or at least is meant to do justice, to its richness, ambiguity and depth. On the other, I 
set out an original phenomenologically-based account of how we should (ethically, 
aesthetically and ‘spiritually’) relate to nature. My conclusion, in brief, is that when it 
is done well phenomenology necessarily involves the exercise of a particular (ethical, 
aesthetic and spiritual) virtue, which I call ‘attention’. This counts as an 
environmental virtue because in modern capitalist societies it is readily developed and 
exercised with respect to specifically natural objects. 
 In making my case I focus on the tradition of existential phenomenology, as 
exemplified by the work of thinkers such as Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.
1
 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are the main players, though other phenomenologists 
(‘existential’ and otherwise) play bit parts, as do a number of contemporary thinkers, 
such as Ted Toadvine and Iain Thomson. My primary aim is not the exegetical one of 
interpreting what the textbook list of phenomenologists had to say about the natural 
environment (with the exception of Heidegger, they didn’t say a great deal). Instead, I 
shamelessly plunder their work in the hope of shedding light on the natural world and 
our relations to it. To make one point I might refer to Heidegger’s work; to make 
another I might draw upon that of Merleau-Ponty. 
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 This is a risky strategy, of course. Phenomenologists frequently disagree with 
one another, often markedly. One only has to compare Husserl’s early conception of 
the phenomenological reduction with Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world, or 
the picture of human relations set out in Being and Nothingness with that defended by 
Levinas. The risk, then, is that in drawing upon the works of a number of 
phenomenologists I might produce a Frankenstein’s monster of a thesis, formed of a 
hotchpotch of incongruous parts. And this would of course be no thesis at all, at least 
no coherent thesis. 
But this danger can be averted. For one thing, on many points – and on most 
of the important ones – existential phenomenologists are in agreement. So, for 
example, one is justified in speaking of ‘the phenomenologist’s’ rejection of Cartesian 
dualism because, despite their various disagreements, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Sartre et al are all of a piece in rejecting this conception of what it means to be 
human. When the differences between the views of different existential 
phenomenologists are very great, I sometimes opt for one phenomenological view 
over another, calling the position I endorse ‘the phenomenological one’. For instance, 
I believe that on the topic of embodiment, Merleau-Ponty’s account is more 
illuminating than that of Heidegger. So in Chapter 1 I endorse a conception which is 
close to that of Merleau-Ponty on this issue, and refer to this position as ‘the 
phenomenological view’ on the understanding that this is not a view that would be 
accepted by all phenomenologists. In other cases, the approach I develop is of my 
own design and so genuinely mine, rather than someone else’s. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
 
The first aim of Chapter 1 is to introduce some prominent phenomenological themes – 
notably, that of being-in-the-world. Its second, more specific aim is to bring a 
phenomenological approach to bear upon the broad question of our place in nature. 
That question is often thought to imply a dilemma: either we are material through and 
through, material parts of a material nature, or there is some soul- or mind-like part of 
us that is supernatural. But this dilemma is, I suggest, false. Adopting a 
phenomenological approach, I show that we may be considered parts of nature in at 
least two distinct senses, neither of which is either materialist or dualist. 
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 I begin by arguing that we can be in nature in the sense of being involved with 
it. This is to say that the natural world can (and typically does) show up for us in the 
light of our lived concerns, that it matters to us. To make my case I refer to a specific 
kind of involvement - practical involvement - and in doing this I draw upon 
Heidegger’s account of concern, as developed in Being and Time. I pay special 
attention to some of the questions raised by a particular kind of practical involvement, 
namely the phenomenon of being at home in a natural environment. Are anti-
modernist writers right to think that we are becoming an increasingly rootless species, 
alienated from the natural world? Can nonhuman animals be at home in an 
environment? And, if they can, do they inhabit their environments in the same way 
that we inhabit ours? Does the phenomenon of being at home in nature have any 
moral significance? Must someone who is at home in a particular natural environment 
be inclined to treat it well? 
 Having responded to these questions, I proceed to outline the second sense in 
which we may be considered parts of nature. My contention here is that we inhere in 
nature, which is to say that we are in nature in a compositional sense, made of the 
same stuff as the things we encounter. To explain what this involves, and to 
distinguish my account from materialism, I refer to Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
embodiment, as set out in Phenomenology of Perception. Having explained how, 
according to that account, our perception of the world is indelibly conditioned by our 
bodies, I move on to consider how our embodiment conditions our perception of 
specifically natural things. 
 In the final pages of the chapter, I argue that, given our involvement with and 
inherence in the world, a certain kind of scientific naturalism, and thus a certain kind 
of naturalistic approach to environmental philosophy, ought to be rejected. 
 
Φ 
 
I begin Chapter 2 by arguing that we can be regarded as parts of nature, not only in 
terms of involvement and inherence, but also in the sense that as subjects amongst 
nonhuman subjects we inhabit a multi-species intersubjective world. To justify this 
claim, I begin by examining Heidegger’s conception of being-with (Mitsein), before 
moving on to investigate the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and what is, in my 
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view, the basis for a more plausible and less anthropocentric account of 
intersubjectivity. 
 In the second section, I turn my attention to a question raised by this account 
of ‘cross-species intersubjectivity’, namely: What reasons do we have for thinking 
that nonhuman animals are conscious? In tackling this question, I begin by setting out 
the various ways a phenomenologist might respond to the sceptical claim that no 
nonhuman animals are conscious. I concede that none of these responses can refute 
scepticism regarding animal minds: despite the phenomenologist’s best efforts, it 
remains logically (and perhaps metaphysically) possible that all nonhuman animals 
are bereft of phenomenal consciousness. However, I contend that a phenomenological 
approach can undercut this kind of scepticism by rendering problematic the general 
conception of interpersonal relations on which it rests. 
 Having addressed the problem of scepticism, I turn to the question of how one 
can determine whether particular animals (and by implication, particular kinds of 
animal) are conscious. Here I examine some of the methods employed in the study of 
animal behaviour, particularly those of cognitive ethology. The first of my two 
conclusions is that if one is to discover whether a particular animal is conscious it 
will, in many cases, be unwise to proceed on the assumption that the animal must, so 
to speak, prove itself through its behaviour to be conscious. My second conclusion is 
that ethological methods are often interpretative rather than inferential, which is to say 
that if a study yields a positive result, a particular behaviour will typically have come 
to disclose itself to the investigator, not as evidence of conscious, but as a conscious 
behaviour – as an angry swish of the tail, perhaps, or a contented purr.  
 In the third and final section I consider how in the light of this account we are 
to understand those cases when ethological investigations make no headway. In some 
cases, I suggest, we are faced with a failure of interpretation: the animal’s life is 
mysterious not because it is the outward sign of an unobservable mental cause, but 
because we cannot decipher it. In other cases, however, the consciousness of the 
animal is called into question. In such cases, it might seem that we are presented with 
two options: either the animal in question is conscious in much the same way that we 
are conscious, or else it is entirely non-conscious, like a rock. Drawing upon 
Heidegger’s work and that of Merleau-Ponty, I argue that this dilemma is in fact false, 
and that matters are more complicated, and more interesting, than is conventionally 
supposed. 
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Φ 
 
In Chapter 3 I turn to the question of how we are to understand the various ways in 
which nature matters to us in the living of our lives. Taking my cue from Heidegger’s 
account of involvement (Befindlichkeit), I suggest that something can matter to us 
without our valuing it, and to support this contention I examine the testimonies of a 
selection of unfortunate individuals who hate or are indifferent towards certain parts 
of the natural world. 
 My main concern in this chapter is, however, with the notion of an 
environmental value. In examining this notion, I begin with Heidegger’s claims that 
‘values-thinking’ is inherently ‘technological’, a manifestation of a domineering and 
exploitative comportment towards the world, and the natural world in particular. I 
suggest that these bold claims cannot be justified. Against Heidegger, there is nothing 
inherently pernicious about talk of value. Nonetheless, I contend that there is 
something problematic about the notion that all the many and various ways in which 
nature matters to us – and, moreover, all the ways that it matters to us morally - can be 
cashed out in terms of environmental values. In support of this claim I refer to 
Christine Swanton’s criticisms of ‘value-centred monism’, as set out in Virtue Ethics: 
A Pluralistic View, and to Alan Holland’s recent argument that environmental 
ethicists ought to be more concerned with the preservation of meaning than the 
promotion of value. I conclude by tracing out the contours of a radical moral 
pluralism, radical in that it postulates, not merely a host of incommensurable values, 
but a variety of different morally relevant factors, including different sorts of bond, 
need and meaning. 
 
Φ 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with moral normativity, the question of how we should act 
with respect to the natural world. I begin with the allegation that phenomenology is 
merely a descriptive exercise which might be able to open our eyes to the manifold 
dimensions of our moral lives but which will not be able to recommend any particular 
course of action. In response, I draw upon the work of Iris Murdoch to argue that 
expertise in phenomenology involves the development and exercise of a particular 
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moral virtue, namely attention. Hence a training in phenomenology is to some extent 
a moral training. Or, to be more precise, attention is a moral virtue, not only for 
eudaimonistic reasons, not only, that is, because it benefits the attentive agent, but for 
what might be called world-directed reasons as well. It is, I propose, a virtue because 
it enables us to ‘see’ things fairly or justly, as they really are. 
 Having set out my arguments for this conclusion, I turn to the question of how 
this bears upon the natural world. My argument here is based on the general claim that 
the development and exercise of attention partly depends on one’s material 
circumstances. Mass-produced objects, I suggest, tend not to invite attention. By 
contrast, natural things do. Hence, in modern capitalist societies, the presence of 
nature tends to foster the development and exercise of attention. In conclusion, I argue 
that we ought to conserve nature in two senses. On the one hand, we ought to 
conserve physical nature: we should take steps to curb pollution, to protect natural 
habitats, to conserve endangered species, and so forth. But on the other hand we 
should try to conserve the meaning nature has for us as a realm independent of our 
practical concerns. In Heidegger’s apt phrase, we should let it be. 
 
Φ 
 
In the fifth and final chapter I consider what my phenomenological approach (or 
indeed any such approach) might be able to say about the notion that the natural world 
exists in itself, independently of human concerns. Many phenomenologists would 
regard any such notion as incoherent. Yet such a stance – ostensibly one of 
metaphysical anti-realism – is unlikely to be welcomed by environmental thinkers. 
For if nature is to command our respect, then surely it must present itself to us as 
existing independently of our ‘merely human’ concerns? 
 The charge, then, is that the phenomenological position on these matters is 
both anti-realist and anthropocentric, and hence at odds with an attitude of respect for 
nature. I respond to it in three ways. First, I concede that, according to the 
phenomenologist, no sense can be made of a world that is not ‘lit up’ in terms of our 
interests, practical concerns, and so forth. However, I contend that this thesis does not 
amount to anthropocentrism, since, in this context, the set of interests, practical 
concerns, etc. that we designate as ours, includes the interests, practical concerns, etc. 
of at least some nonhuman animals. 
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 Second, I accept that phenomenology cannot accommodate the notion of a 
world that is radically independent of our concerns, but I suggest that this is no cause 
for regret, since any such notion is incoherent. Indeed, once one relinquishes the 
notion that there is a way the world is ‘in itself’, it becomes clear that 
phenomenological investigations are especially well suited to elucidating the various 
ways in which nature discloses itself to us as an independent reality. To illustrate this, 
I examine (1) the disclosure of the world as an object, not just for us, but for 
nonhuman subjects as well, and (2) its disclosure as a realm indifferent to (and in this 
sense independent of) human concerns. 
 In developing my third response to the charge of anthropocentrism, I begin by 
investigating the claim that, although whatever presents itself to us in experience 
necessarily does so in the light of our concerns, the ‘process’ by which anything 
presents itself at all is partly transhuman – an event of Being, perhaps, or an 
intertwining of a ‘flesh’ that ‘traverses’ us. I argue that, heard in the right way, claims 
of this sort can awaken us to the presence of that more-than-human ‘nature’ which 
moves within us when we perceive anything. 
 
Φ 
 
I hope these arguments will demonstrate the benefits of a phenomenological approach 
to environmental philosophy. But as they say, the proof of the pudding is in the 
tasting. So with this in mind, it is time to turn to our first topic, the question of our 
place in nature. 
 
                                                 
1
 Hence the approach I take is not ‘transcendental’, ‘constitutive’ or ‘hermeneutic’. 
On the different kinds of phenomenology, see Moran 1999. 
